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International Political Economy
International political economy (IPE) is a subset of 
the discipline of International Relations that exam­
ines political actors’ efforts to govern and shape in­
ternational economic events. For instance, increased 
trade interdependence in the international econ­
omy tends to create winners (beneficiaries) and 
losers (harmed groups) within nation states. Who 
these groups are, and how different political actors, 
ranging from voters to labor unions to business 
groups to elected officials, try to govern the effects 
of international trade concerns the study of interna­
tional political economy. At the same time, actors 
affect international economic relations by pursuing
their preferences regarding economic outcomes on 
the international arena. For instance, the history of 
the major global economic institutions created 
for the post-Second World War world, including the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), demonstrates US leaders’ commit­
ment to generate economic interdependence among 
nations. In sum, IPE examines the “reciprocal and 
dynamic interaction” between politics and econom­
ics in international relations (Gilpin 1975).
A Snapshot of the Discipline. As a subdiscipline of 
international relations, IPE is relatively young, dating 
back only to the 1970s. In that decade, a number of 
major international economic developments—such 
as the 1973 oil crisis, the rise of the European and 
Japanese economies, and the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system—directed 
attention to the study of international economic 
events, as distinct from international security. The 
i970salsowitnessedtheglobalspreadofmultinational 
corporations, which have not only acted as primary 
agents of foreign direct investment but have also 
changed the pattern of production by distributing 
different parts of the production process of a good to 
different countries. The major economic events of 
the 1980s, such as the Latin American debt crisis, 
bolstered the growth of IPE.
Given that globalization has become an increas­
ingly relevant concept for understanding interna­
tional relations, IPE has evolved to study the 
determinants as well as the effects of globalization. 
Globalization can be understood as the increasing 
interdependence of different parts of the world 
through the cross-border movement of goods, ser­
vices, and capital, as well as the institutions that 
generate and/or govern this independence, includ­
ing international nonstate actors (ranging from 
nongovernmental organizations to international 
business) and international organizations (such as 
the IMF). Globalization is not new, and scholars 
debate whether the levels of interdependence in the 
nineteenth century and up until the onset of the 
First World War supersede the levels of interdepen­
dence witnessed today. These debates aside, IPE
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increasingly focuses on examining the phenomenon 
of globalization.
The diversity and divisions within IPE are worth­
while to note. First, Benjamin Cohen (2008) has 
argued that there is a British School of IPE and an 
American School of IPE. The “American School,” 
Cohen argues, is wedded to “positivism and empiri­
cism,” which means the testing of hypotheses against 
data is prioritized (p. 4). In contrast, the “British 
School” focuses more on normative questions (p. 44). 
Even if one disagrees with Cohen’s labeling of these 
two schools of thought, which is not a geographical, 
but rather a school-of-thought divide, his analysis 
still highlights the different kinds of questions and 
approaches found in IPE. Belatedly but distinctly, 
there are methodological divisions in answering key 
puzzles in IPE, the primary division being between 
qualitative (such as case study methodology) and 
quantitative approaches (such as regression analy­
ses). Qualitative approaches need not be norma- 
tively driven—they can (and often do) have a 
positivist approach underlying them. Still, the data 
and the testing in qualitative analyses differ, by 
definition, from quantitative analyses. Mixed ap­
proaches combine both quantitative and qualitative 
work. Also, even within each school of thought, such 
as the American School of IPE, there are different 
theoretical/analytical approaches.
Dominant Approaches, Key Issues. What follows 
is a brief introduction to the main theoretical/ 
analytical paradigms that has dominated the 
American school of IPE since its beginnings: 
realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These three 
approaches dominate the analytical frameworks 
utilized in articles published in the top IPE journals 
(Maliniak and Tierney, 2009). The broad charac­
teristic of each approach is discussed at the expense 
of nuances.
Realism. Realist approaches to IPE, by and large, 
share the following attributes. First, they tend to be 
state-centric in that states, and not nonstate actors 
such as multinational corporations, are the primary 
units of analysis. Most realist analyses tend to see 
nonstate actors governed by state actions, an ex­
ample being multinational corporations ultimately
being circumscribed by state regulation. Realist 
accounts treat states as unitary actors. Second, the 
role of power and the distribution of power among 
states are paramount in explaining outcomes, with 
power generally denoting capabilities. For instance, 
these works might highlight how global regulatory 
outcomes, such as the regulation of financial 
markets, can be explained with reference to great 
power preferences (Drezner, 2007). By virtue of these 
two factors, third, realist analyses tend to be 
“systemic” in that they focus on the interaction of 
states and the outcomes produced by that 
interaction. In this respect, the study of domestic 
politics is, at best, secondary to the analysis of 
strategic state interaction. Because it is emblematic 
of these points, and because it has had a significant 
impact on the field of IPE, a brief discussion of 
hegemonic stability theory follows.
Hegemonic stability theory argues that periods of 
hegemony (when there is a dominant power in the 
international system) are associated within eco­
nomic openness (such as to international trade) in 
the international system, and that a hegemon is 
necessary for such a system (Krasner, 1976). The he­
gemon will prefer to open up to international trade, 
as Krasner points out, because the potential benefits 
(e.g., an increase in aggregate income) of it doing so 
exceed the potential costs (e.g., potential destabiliz­
ing from shifts in the national economy). The hege­
mon can also induce others to enhance their 
participation in international trade through the 
provision of incentives and disincentives. For in­
stance, the hegemon can use side payments, such as 
increased foreign aid, to persuade other states to 
(further) open their economies to trade. The hege­
mon can also disincentivize the opposite behavior 
by punishing those that protect their economies 
from trade. Core to hegemonic stability theory is the 
notion that different distributions of power lead to 
different types of political-economic outcomes.
The importance of distribution of power is also 
present in realist approaches to the study of interna­
tional institutions. While some strands of realism do 
not take institutions seriously, realism in general, 
and realist works in IPE in particular, concede the
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importance of international institutions. Having 
said this, realist works remain more pessimistic 
about the ability of institutions to resolve conflicts 
among states for two distinct but interrelated rea­
sons. One, realists believe that states worry about 
relative gains in cooperation—they worry not how 
much they will gain absolutely, but how much they 
will gain (or lose) vis-^-vis other states. Ihe distribu­
tion of power comes into play here, because a state’s 
concern with its position in that distribution is what 
generates its concerns for relative gains. Second, 
realist works note that only certain types of problems 
can be solved through international institutions. 
Even when states agree that no agreement is unde­
sirable, they might disagree about which agreement 
they prefer, given that different agreements have dif­
ferent distributional consequences for states (Kras- 
ner, 1991). In these cases, the powerful states might 
dictate which agreement is chosen. Overall, the real­
ist approach focuses on the role of power in not only 
shaping the rules of international institutions but 
also in enforcing these rules. In this respect, realist 
discussions of international economic institutions, 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, or the World Trade 
Organization, will tend to focus on how the economic 
heavyweights dominate these institutions.
Liberalism. Liberal approaches to the study of the 
world economy are currently more prevalent in 
IPE than other theories/ffameworks. Core to the 
liberal approach to understanding IPE is examining 
the interrelationship between domestic political- 
economic factors and international political- 
economic factors (Frieden and Martin, 2003). The 
variety of approaches to IPE that can be labeled as 
focusing on the domestic-international interaction, 
however, differ regarding their emphases on the 
international versus the domestic factors in this 
interaction.
The liberal literature has a number of identifiable 
phases of evolution. First, these scholars have criti­
cized realism for not taking into account adequately 
economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 
1977). This work has not only drawn attention to the 
importance of economic relations among states, but 
it has also aimed to move the debate on IPE from an
exclusive focus on state actors to one that also in­
cludes international nonstate actors and interna­
tional organizations. It has also taken aim at the 
realist assumption of states as unitary actors by 
pointing to interactions among agencies in different 
states.
Second, liberal approaches have centralized the 
role of international organizations in interstate in­
teraction and emphasized how these institutions 
facilitate interstate cooperation. This strand of the 
literature is now generally labeled as neo-liberal in­
stitutionalism. While power has not been absent 
from neoliberal institutionalist analysis, it also has 
not been central. The core aim of neoliberal institu­
tionalism has been to explain the functions that in­
stitutions serve to facilitate interstate cooperation 
even in the face of declining hegemony (Keohane, 
1984). In his seminal work, Keohane emphasized 
that institutions allow states to pursue mutually 
beneficial goals through, largely, the provision of in­
formation and the reduction of transaction costs. For 
instance, through their rules, institutions facilitate 
reciprocity, enhance the monitoring of state actions, 
and by providing stable platforms for interaction, 
they allow repeated interstate interactions, thereby 
bolstering the importance of state reputation. This is 
not to suggest that liberal accounts are the only ones 
to have taken cooperation seriously. As just dis­
cussed, strands of realism have done so as well. 
However, to put it in Krasner’s terms (1991), liberal 
(institutionalist) accounts are more interested in fo­
cusing on how institutions help states reach the 
“Pareto frontier.” Pareto optimal outcomes are those 
under which no party can be made better off with­
out another party being made worse off.
Third, liberal approaches have focused on inte­
grating the role of domestic politics into the analysis 
of IPE. In early liberal work, this was done in a 
number of ways, including tbe examination of the 
domestic origins of foreign economic policy (e.g., 
Katzenstein, 1978) as well as through a focus on the 
interrelationship between the domestic and the in­
ternational levels. On the latter, Putnam’s (1988) 
two-level games put forward an analytical model 
that showed that the presence of international-level
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negotiations led to domestic policies that would 
otherwise have not been pursued, while negotiators 
also pushed for economic agreements on the inter­
national level that would be acceptable to key con­
stituencies on the domestic level.
In addition to expanding insights from these ear­
lier studies, various aspects of the domestic-interna­
tional interaction continue to be core to the liberal 
agenda today. Under this rubric. Open Economic 
Politics (OEP) is an increasingly common approach 
(Lake, 2006). OEP borrows closely from international 
economic theories to derive the interests of (groups) 
of individuals that are beneficiaries versus losers 
from globalization, with a view to later on seeing 
how these interests are organized collectively and 
how existing political institutions give expression (or 
not) to them. For instance, the Eleckscher-Ohlin 
(HO) theory of international trade holds that there 
are three factors of production (land, labor, capital) 
and in each country, one of these factors is most 
abundant. A country exports goods produced with 
its most abundant factor. For instance, China ex­
ports goods that are labor intensive. In turn, exten­
sions to HO hold that trade will benefit individuals 
that are endowed with the factor with which their 
economy is relatively more endowed (Hiscox, 2010). 
Thus, we would expect the policy preference of la­
borers in China to be pro-trade. How these policy 
preferences get filtered through different national 
institutions still demands analysis, and some liberal 
works are more focused on the role of these institu­
tions than on deriving the interests of different 
groups. While authors who embrace OEP do not 
deny the complexities involved (for instance, indi­
viduals are not just participants in the labor market, 
they are also consumers) and recognize that other 
factors (such as feelings of nationalism) might play 
into policy preferences, the crux of the theory rests 
on individuals having a materialist orientation 
toward international openness. This orientation 
draws criticism from constructivists.
Constructivism. Constructivists disagree with the 
liberal approach’s inference of (material) interests 
from the position of actors in the national economy 
(for instance, is the actor an exporter or an importer?).
as they believe that ideas (and other nonmaterial 
factors, including norms and culture) constitute 
interests. Different strands of constructivist research 
offer different interpretations regarding how much 
of the material world is contingent upon 
interpretation—namely, the extent to which there 
are objective facts as opposed to subjective under­
standings. Regardless, the point for constructivists 
is that “structures do not come with an instruction 
sheet” (Blyth, 2003). Thus, agents’ ideas about who 
they are, what they interpret their interests to be, 
and how they imderstand their environment cannot 
be left out of the analysis. Also, the notion of 
intersubjective meanings, which are collectively 
held understandings, is key to understanding social 
interaction.
An example of these points comes from the 2008 
financial crisis (Abdelal et al., 2010). First, as con­
structivists point out, how policymakers defined the 
roots of this financial crisis was intrinsically related 
to ideas. For instance, defining the crisis as one of 
lack of liquidity in financial markets leads to differ­
ent policy outcomes than defining the crisis as one 
of the failures of American-style capitalism. Second, 
constructivists have suggested that more than ma­
terial considerations had to be at play, because even 
though the US was the epicenter of the crisis and 
the US economy was widely judged to be overlever­
aged, investors viewed US-denominated sovereign 
debt as a safe haven. Thus, how agents interpret 
their material environment, constructivists empha­
size, is necessary to make sense of events here.
The constructivist agenda also has important im­
plications for the study of international institutions. 
First, constructivists analyze international organi­
zations as being capable of acting as independent 
agents. For instance, the staffs of these organiza­
tions, such as the management of the IMF, push 
their own ideas or norms, which then affect state be­
havior. Second, constructivists analyze international 
institutions as platforms for the “socialization” of 
states. Put differently, while states may begin inter­
acting with one another at institutions with a de­
fined set of preferences, how they define their 
preferences may change as they socialize with other
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states within institutions (e.g., Johnston, 2001). In 
this regard, it is not only the staff of the international 
organization as independent agents, but also the in­
teraction with other states, that alters states’ per­
ceptions of their interests. Third, states’ adherence 
to international institutional rules cannot be 
explained simply with reference to the pursuit of 
state interests. Constructivists argue that beyond 
the material reasons put forward by realists and lib­
erals, states may have nonmaterial reasons for cre­
ating institutions as well as abiding by them. 
Institutions, they emphasize, also reflect the values 
of international society.
Constructivist research often focuses on (groups 
of) individuals with the ultimate aim of discussing 
collective understanding or social change. For in­
stance, as indicated above, constructivists empha­
size the role of ideas. Since the originators and 
disseminators of ideas, as well as their recipients, 
are likely to be individuals, an analysis of these in­
dividuals and how they transmit their ideas is im­
portant in understanding changes in the social 
environment. For example, the spread of Keynes­
ian approaches to economic policy (on the national 
or the international level) cannot be discussed 
without also discussing the agents who positively 
view Keynesian ideas. The behavior of these indi­
viduals, then, goes on to explain the policies of 
larger units, including international organizations 
and governments.
This survey of the literature does not suggest that 
all work is theoretically driven, nor does it suggest 
that all aforementioned authors are self-identified 
members of one of the three theoretical groups iden­
tified. It does, however, imply that even in empiri­
cally driven work, one of the analytical frameworks 
discussed above is often consulted. For instance, an 
author’s concern may be driven by the empirical 
concern of understanding how the US allocates its 
foreign aid. Here, it is possible that the author con­
sults a combination of theories without being com­
mitted to proving the supremacy of one over the 
others. For instance, as is now known, US foreign-aid 
patterns result from a number of diverse concerns, 
including US geostrategic concerns, normative
concerns about poverty, and Congressional pol­
itics of aid allocation. In other words, relying on a 
number of different analytical frameworks may be 
necessary in order to answer key empirical ques­
tions. By the same token, in pursuit of these empiri­
cal questions, authors may develop and refine 
theory. For instance, the empirical finding provided 
in the IPE literature that the US and other major 
shareholders influence who gets loans from the 
IMF provides a clear articulation of the influence of 
power in international institutions. In sum, the the­
oretical approaches are not straightjackets but tools 
for systematic analysis.
Normative Implications of IPE Research. At the 
onset, it was identified that some authors have 
argued that American IPE neglects normative 
questions. Regardless of whether this criticism is 
justified, empirical research can offer normative 
insights. For instance, different scholars have 
emphasized how the US’s influence in multilateral 
economic institutions, particularly the IMF and the 
World Bank, has led to these institutions’ advocating 
a specific model of economic development. This 
model, known as the Washington Consensus 
model of economic development, places an emphasis 
on liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. 
And, some scholars have argued that the Consensus 
model of development does not have a good record 
in promoting economic development, and that 
it overlooks the complex ways in which economic 
development is state led as opposed to market 
driven. There is by no means a scholarly consensus 
on this topic. Nonetheless, these findings are 
important not just in terms of what international 
organizations are doing; they also provide 
instruments for assessing what these organizations 
should be doing. In another example, the finding 
that income inequality is rising in some states 
facilitates not just empirical questions, such as the 
relationship between rising inequality and global 
forces, but also normative questions, such as 
whether/why we should care about high levels of 
inequality. Overall, then, there does not have to be 
a big disconnect between the empirical and nor­
mative realms of research.
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Into the Future? The 2008 financial crisis, which 
started as a capital-markets panic that emanated 
from the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US in 
September 2008 and rapidly became a global finan­
cial crisis that ultimately put much of the developed 
world in the worst economic downtown since the 
worldwide depression of the 1930s, might impact IPE. 
First, because the crisis’s roots are political in a 
number of ways, scholars have begun to take stock of 
how well the IPE literature did in predicting it 
(Helleiner, 2011). Opinions here differ, but for those 
who are convinced that IPE did a poor job of predict­
ing the crisis, the kind of questions that the discipline 
seeks to answer might be augmented going forward. 
For instance, as some scholars have emphasized, 
more analysis on how disparate findings (e.g., poorly 
regulated financial markets, too-low interest rates 
in the US, innovation in financial products, excess 
savings in developing countries, and so on) connect 
to one another might be necessary. Second, it is 
plausible to expect (and there is already preliminary 
evidence to this end) that IPE will engage in a ret­
roactive analysis of the causes of the latest financial 
crisis as well as governments’ reaction to dealing with 
the crisis. For instance, some governments engaged 
in fiscal stimuli (associated with Keynesianism, which 
had been sidelined for a number of decades), which 
raises questions about whether major policy changes 
will occur. Third, to the extent that the crisis solidifies 
long-term trends about the rise of emerging markets 
(developing countries with high levels of economic 
growth sustained over a period of time) and the 
relative decline of advanced economies, it might 
generate renewed interest in the distribution of 
economic power in the global economic system, and 
its effects on political structures. After all, before the 
crisis, the notion that debt crises originate fi'om or 
primarily affect developing economies, which was a 
view that gained traction after the Asian Financial 
Crisis of the 1990s, was the dominant viewpoint 
(and concern) of large segments of academia and 
international groups such as the IMF.
[See also Constructivism; International Relations; 
Liberalism; and Realism.]
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